Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 42

Issue 1

Article 1

1953

Kentucky Decisions on Future Interests (1938-1953)
W. Lewis Roberts
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Roberts, W. Lewis (1953) "Kentucky Decisions on Future Interests (1938-1953)," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 42: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol42/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Kentucky Decisions on Future Interests (1938-1953)
By W. LEWIS

ROBERTS*

Future property interests are often defined as those estates in
property that are to come into possession of the owners at some
time subsequent to their creation. Earlier articles published in
the Journal have covered the decisions of the Court of Appeals in
this field down to 1988.1
In treating this subject it is the practice to review the decisions
under the following headings: Remainders, Reversion and Possibility of Reverter, Executory Limitations, Construction of Limitations, Powers, The Rule against Perpetuities and Restraints on
Alienation. It is proposed to follow this order in reviewing the
recent cases.

I. Remainders
The necessity of determining whether a remainder is vested
or contingent has been presented as frequently to the court during the past fifteen years as in prior years. In Montgomery's Ex'r
v. Northcutt2 Judge Thomas cites with approval the following
distinction drawn between vested and contingent remainders:
"The present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession was to become vacant, and not the
certainty that the possession will become vacant, before
the estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent."3
In the case before the court, a devise was made to testator's
daughter for life, then to testator's descendants if the daughter
should die without heirs of the body surviving her. Any issue
and surviving spouse of testator's two sons, who predeceased the
daughter, were held to take as the remainders were vested. In
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, A.B., Brown University; A.M.,
Pennsylvania State College; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University.
'12 Ky. L. J. 58, 115, 210 (1923); 13 Ky. L. J. 32, 83, 186 (1924); 15 Ky.
L. J. 345 (1927); 16 Ky. L. J. 98 (1927); 21 Ky. L. J. 219 (1933); 26 Ky. L. J.
269 (1937); and 30 Ky. L. J. 61 (1940).
2 292 Ky. 622, 167 S.W. 2d 317 (1942).
3 3 Caldwell's Kentucky Judicial Dictionary 2895.
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another case4 a devise to testator's widow for life or until she remarried with remainder share and share alike, to testator's seven
children, created a vested remainder in the children. Two children predeceased their mother. The court construed the gift as
vested and not contingent and relied on the case of Grubbs v.
Grubbs,5 which approved Kent's statement that the law favors
vested estates, and no remainder will be construed as contingent
which may, consistently with the intention of testatrix, be deemed
vested."
In Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Rudd,' the question before the
court involved a conveyance by deed where a son was to have the
land during his natural life and thereafter it was to pass to the
son's heirs. The deed provided that if the son should die without
heirs the land should revert to the grantor if living, if not living
then to the grantor's other children. The court said this gave the
son a life estate and a contingent remainder in the only other child
of the grantor, the plaintiff in the case, who was suing for the
value of timber which defendant purchased from the life tenant.
It was admitted that a contingent remainderman can maintain
an action for waste, since a trial court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, can make orders conserving any amount recovered.
The plaintiff in this case was barred by the statute of limitations,
however.
Where a testator devised land to his daughter and on her
death to her children if any, and if she died without children,
then the land to be equally divided between testator's other
daughters; it was held that the adopted children of the daughter
could not take the land under the daughter's will.8 Although the

statute of adoption was effective to make the children her own
heirs, it did not give the adopted children the right to take as
remaindermen under the will of her father.
In Mauser v. Security Trust Co.,9 the estate devised was to go
to any children the life tenant might have. An unborn infant's
interest was a contingent remainder which became a vested remainder upon its birth. The court followed its holding in the
"Fugazzi v. Fugazzi's Committee, 275 Ky. 62, 120 S.W. 2d 779 (1938).
'190 Ky. 258, 227 S.W. 272 (1921).
'4 KEN's ComENTAPIs (11th ed. 1867) 203.
'276 Ky. 721, 124 S.W. 2d 1063 (1939).

'Sanders v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24, 128 S.W. 2d 223 (1939).
279 Ky. 453, 130 S.W. 2d 768 (1939).
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Bourbon Agricultural Bank and Trust'0 case that the fee in such
case pending the happening of the contingency, the birth of a
child in this case, was not in nubibus, as the early cases used to
maintain. It was in the heirs of the testator meantime.
A conveyance to the grantor's niece for life and at her death
to her bodily heirs created a life estate in the niece and a remainder in her children." Under the rule in Shelley's case a fee
tail would have been created in the niece but this rule was
abrogated by statute in Kentucky.' 2 The conveyance here was
made in consideration of the niece's promise to support the
grantor and the agreement created a condition subsequent. On
failure to support, a "reversionary clause" gave the grantor the
power to reenter for condition broken. The niece's reconveyance
in consideration of a release of the obligation to support deprived
the children of their remainder. Since a rescission and re-transfer
of complete title could be accomplished by a voluntary abandonment of the undertaking to support, the court said, they saw no
reason why the same result could not be accomplished by agreement. The title of the children depended upon the fulfillment of
the condition to support the grantor. Where the life tenant held
under an oral agreement with a cotenant for the statutory period,
the evidence was held insufficient to support a title by adverse
possession against the remaindermen in the case of Barnett v.
Barnett.3 The court said the presumption is that one cotenant
occupies the land subject to the rights of the others.
A conveyance of realty by a husband gave to his wife a life
estate with remainder to their children. The couple were later
divorced. At the time of the conveyance they had six children,
two of whom died in their infancy, unmarried and without issue.
The wife remarried and later died without having had other
children. The husband remarried but had no children by his
second marriage. The court found the intent of the grantor was
to give the remainder to the children of his first marriage and the
four children being over twenty-one years of age could convey a
4
good title to the property.
1205

Ky. 297, 265, 265 S.W. 790, 794 (1924).

Lawson v. Asberry, 288 Ky. 890, 141 S.W. 2d 564 (1940).
Kr. STATs.,
2845,
Kr.
v. STAT. (1948), sec. 881.090.
"288 Ky. 710,see.
142 S.W.now
2d 975 (1940).
"Sermersheim v. Ackerman, 284 Ky. 857, 144 S.W. 2d 804 (1940).
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Where a gift over after a life estate was made to testatrx's
"grandnieces and nephews then living," it was intended to include both grandnieces and grandnephews as the word "grand"
was intended to modify both the words "nieces" and "nephews"
living at the death of the life tenant. On the death of the life
tenant the grandnieces and grand nephews then living acquired
a fee-simple interest in the property.' 5 Under a devise of land
with remainder over if the devisee should die without issue, the
two sons of the devisee were allowed to bring an action under
Section 491 of the Civil Code of Practice to sell the land and
have the proceeds reinvested.1 6 As to the right to sell a remainder,
the court pointed out in Pointdexterv. Brumagen'7 that the right
to sell a remainder belonging to an infant or an insane person is
wholly statutory. In a case where the life tenant sold the property
under the provisions of Section 490 of the Civil Code, he claimed
he was entitled to the cash value of his life estate as shown by
the mortality tables. The court held he was entitled only to the
use or interest in the proceeds.' 8 Since living contingent remaindermen sufficiently represent the interests of the class, a sale
under Section 491 for reinvestment will be affirmed.' 9
The court has very often had the task of construing provisions
to determine whether a remainder or some other future interest
was intended by the person executing the instrument. Where a
husband conveyed realty to his wife and specified that if she did
not sell it during the husband's life it should go to the husband at
her death, otherwise to their children; the remainder at all times
after the expiration of the life estate was held to be in the husband, subject, however, to be defeated by contingencies provided
for in the deed.20 Testatrix devised to her husband for life with remainder to son, then "to any heirs of his body, but if none, then
remainder interest to be divided equally between my sisters and
brothers." A power in the husband and son gave them a right to
sell privately and convey good title. Contingent remaindermen
not in esse would be bound, the court said.2 ' In McKnight v.
Shedd's Adm'r v. Gayle, 288 Ky. 466, 156 S.W. 2d 490 (1941).
° Stone v. Campbell, 290 Ky. 82, 160 S.W. 2d 325 (1942).
'301 Ky. 699, 192 S.W. 2d 960 (1946).
' Divine v. Divine, 305 Ky. 486, 204 S.W. 2d 804 (1947).
Powell v. Childers, 314 Ky. 45, 234 S.W. 2d 158 (1950).
" Cornelison v. Yelton, 296 Ky. 501, 177 S.W. 2d 879 (1944).
' Childers v. Welch, 304 Ky. 700, 202 S.W. 2d 169 (1947).
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Fleming,2 2 the husband was given the property during his life
with authority to sell any part of the realty to meet his living expenses. At his death the property was to go to a granddaughter
"to be absolutely under her control." It was held that the granddaughter took a remainder in fee simple. A bequest in trust to
testator's widow for life or until she remarry, then to be paid to
testator's two sons, created a vested remainder in one-half in each
son.2 3 In Hall v. Hall,24 testator left his entire estate to his widow
with full power to dispose of the same during her life or by will,
but "should Lena R. Hall die without a will disposing of all or
any part of said estate then in that event.. ." to testator's brother
if living. It was held the remainder of the estate passed to the
brother. A conveyance by deed to a father for life with remainder
to children, if any, gave the children a vested remainder. The
share of a child who died intestate prior to the father's death was
inherited by his parents. 25 In another recent case, Clay v. Security
Trust Co.,2 " a testator gave the residue of his estate to his sister
for life and at her death to a nephew, to be held in trust until the
nephew should reach the age of thirty-five years, when the corpus
of the trust was to be paid to him. He predeceased the life tenant,
his mother, before having attained the age of thirty-five years.
The court held he had a vested remainder which was not defeated
by his death before reaching thirty-five years of age.
During the last fifteen years several cases have come before
the court where the life estates have been devised to widows
and they have renounced the provisions made for them under the
wills. The question presented in these cases was the effect of
such renunciations on the remaindermen's rights. The holdings
have uniformly been that the remainders have been precipitated
and the remaindermen have come into possession at once.Y7
Likewise the question whether a remainderman is barred by

2309 Ky. 486, 218 S.W. 2d 44 (1949).

'

Fitschen v. United States Trust Co., 318 Ky. 700, 238 S.W. 2d 405 (1950).
"314 Ky. 733, 237 S.W. 2d 55 (1951).
'Rose v. Bryant, 2.51 S.W. 2d 860 (1952).
"252 S.W. 2d 906 (1952).
' Baldwin's Coex'rs v. Curry, 272 Ky. 827, 115 S.W. 2d 333 (1938); Farmers
Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 308 Ky. 748, 215 S.W. 2d 842 (1948); Gunn v.
Sutherland, 311 Ky. 578, 224 S.W. 2d 929 (1949); Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky.

125, 234 S.W. 2d 489 (1950); Shepard v. Moore, 283 Ky. 181, 140 S.W. 2d 810
(1940).
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the statute of limitations from asserting his right to the property
continues to call for consideration.28
In Pope v. Kirk29 the effect of an alteration in the deed in
order to create remainders was considered. The notary public, at
the request of the grantee, inserted in the deed the words "and
her grandchildren at second party's death." There was no evidence that the grantor knew of the change. The alteration would
create a life estate in the grantee with remainder in her grandchildren. The court held the deed must be considered in its
original form. The grantee, however, was estopped from denying
the title of a grantee of two of the grandchildren and her grantee
was also precluded from denying the title of such grantee.
In passing upon the question of a merger, the court said there
can be no merger of a life estate and a defeasible fee in remainder.80
An interested party, it was held in Forman v. Brent,31 can
force the sale of property given in a testamentary trust to testator's
widow for life and at her death to be sold and the proceeds
divided among testator's children or their descendants.
Whether a life tenant or the remainderman is entitled to a
stock dividend was raised in the case of Bai's Ex'r v. Woodford
Bank & Trust Co.32 In that case the life tenant died on December 3. The stockholders of the bank passed a resolution for a
stock dividend on December 10. The directors' resolution of November 26 was not an unequivocal declaration of a dividend.
Their action was conditional and the court held the stock dividend
went to the remainderman.
Finally the question has come before the court as to whether
a remainderman may waive his interest or a part thereof. A
testator devised half his estate to one of his sons with the proviso:
"In the event Robert should die before his brother Edward, then
in that event his half of the property is to pass to Edward or to
Edward's child or children." In an earlier case before the court
it had been adjudged that Edward had a contingent remainder
Slacek's Ex'r v. Barrett, 290 Ky. 251, 160 S.W. 2d 657 (1942); Brittenun v.
Cunningham, 310 Ky. 181, 220 S.W. 2d 100 (1949); and Wheeler v. Kazee, 253
S.W. 2d 378 (1952).
255 S.W. 2d 468 (1953).
* Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945).
"309 Ky. 735, 218 S.W. 2d 655 (1949).
"311 Ky. 474, 224 S.W. 2d 678 (1949).
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interest in the trust fund, the contingency being his survival.
Robert was adjudged incompetent and his committee filed a bill
to have the corpus of the trust encroached upon. Edward, considering himself as the sole remainderman, gave his consent to the
committee's taking $125 a month for the care of his brother
Robert. The trustee requested that the property be divided
equally between the two brothers. A judgment allowing Edward
to waive his right and permit the trustee to take the amount
agreed upon from the corpus for the support of Robert was approved on appeal. 33
II. Reversions and Rights of Reverter
In passing upon whether a reversionary interest can be transferred by will, the court referred to the early decision of Alexander
v. de Kermel,3 4 which cited Blackstone's definition of a reversion
as "the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in
possession after the determination of some particular estate
granted out by him." They accepted the proposition that "Whatever is descendable is devisable. That which one owns, he can
dispose of by will." 35
In Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,36 it was said that
if a man devises a life estate and then the remainder to his own
heirs, he creates not a remainder but a reversion in himself. The
court disapproved of the decision in Mcllvaine v. Robinson,3
stating that as a rule of construction of wills the doctrine of
worthier title does not aid in construing wills. The provision in
the will that if the testator's daughter should die without children
or descendants the estate should go to her heirs at law was held
to fall under the fourth rule laid down in Harvey v. Bell,38 which
reads:
"On the other hand where there is no intervening estate,
and no other period to which the words 'dying without issue'
can be reasonably referred, they are held, in the absence of
something in the will evidencing a contrary intent, to create
a defeasible fee which is defeated by the death of the
devisee at any time without issue then living."
Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 247 S.W. 2d 533 (1952).
81 Ky. 345, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 382 (1883).
Murphy v. Boling, 273 Ky. 827, 117 S.W. 2d 962 (1938).
" 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W. 2d 181 (1940).
161 Ky. 616, 171 S.W. 413 1914).
118 Ky. 512 at 523, 81 S.W. 671 (1904).
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The court concluded that the heirs of the testator took the
property as purchasers under the will and not by inheritance.
In Pewitt v. Workman 9 a deed conveyed a life estate to the
grantor's wife with remainder to his heirs. This created a reversion in the grantor which passed to his wife under his will.
It was pointed out in Rhodes v. Bennett40 that the terms "reservation" and "exception" have been used interchangeably in
deeds. In that case a deed set aside a one-half acre tract for
school purposes. The term "reserve" was used in the sense of
"exception" in the deed and no title was thereby conveyed to the
school authorities. Their occupation, the court said, had been
adverse to the owners and a judgment to quiet title was denied
the owners of tracts from which the school lot had been taken.
In Hardesty v. Coats"' a will provided if either of the sons of
testator should die leaving no bodily issue "....

their part shall

revert to my estate in trust." It was held that a contingent reversion was valid and the land reverted to testator's estate upon
the happening of the contingency or event even though the
testator died before the occurrence of the contingency. In another
case a devise of a life estate without further provision was held
good as a life estate with a reversion in the devisor's heirs.42 In
Mills v. Taylor,43 a deed provided that if the grantees failed to
sell or devise the property "in their lifetime, then said property
shall fall to the legal heirs of the bodies" of the grantors "when
these grantors (A. Y. Mills and Nancy Mills) shall have deceased."
The grantees, shortly after the deed was given, sold the land.
The court observed that even if the grantees had only a defeasible
fee up until that time it then became finally vested.
The well established proposition that a reservation or exception cannot be made in favor of a stranger to the deed was emphasized in Seward v. Seward.44 An exception in the deed in that
case purported to be in favor of a stranger. The court, however,
held it might operate in favor of the grantor to exclude the part
"289 Ky. 459, 159 S.W. 2d 21 (1942).
'0307 Ky. 507, 211 S.W. 2d 693 (1948). See also Flynn v. Fike, 291 Ky.
316, 164 S.W. 2d 470 (1942).
4 287 Ky. 675> 155 S.W. 2d 8 (1941).
" White v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 313 Ky. 280, 230 S.W. 2d
899 (1950).
"249 S.W. 2d 779 (1953).
"252 S.W. 2d 869 (1952).
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in question from the conveyance. The court cited with approval
its decision to that effect in Slone v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas
Co. 4
Considering a possibility of reverter, we turn to where land
is conveyed for so long as it is used for a particular purpose, the
grantee acquiring a fee that is determinable upon the land being
no longer used for the particular purpose. In such case it reverts
to the grantor or his heirs. The grantor in the meantime does not
have a future estate in the land but only a mere possibility of reacquiring it if it is no longer used for the purpose named. A possibility of reverter is to be distinguished from a right of entry for
condition broken. In the latter a fee may be granted upon a condition subsequent that, for example, a certain thing shall not be
done on the land. If the condition is broken, the title of the
grantee becomes voidable and the grantor must enter to reacquire
title to the land. In the case of the possibility of reverter upon
happening of the event named, the title at once returns to the
grantor without his taking any steps to reacquire it.
In Fayette County v. Morton"6 land was conveyed for an electric railway with the provision that if abandoned for an electric
raihoad the property should revert to the grantors, owners of the
adjoining property. The possibility of reverter was held valid and
did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
In 179S two lots in the city of Frankfort were deeded to the
Commonwealth of Kentucky for the "special purpose of erecting
a jail and Penitentiary House and other appendages." The court
construed the latter phrase as expressing the occasion for making
the conveyance and not as a "condition subsequent" and that"no reverter of the land" was created in the grantor's heirs. The
fact that the conveyance was to the Commonwealth in conformity
to an act of the legislature influenced the court in arriving at this
decision.
This problem of possibility of reverter most often comes up
where land has been given for school or religious purposes. It
was pointed out in Devine v. Isham4 8 that express words of reservation are not necessary in a deed to create a right of reverter.
289 Ky. 623, 159 S.W.2d 993 (1942).
" 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W.2d 953 (1940).
17 Willams v. Johnson, Governor, 284 Ky. 23, 143 S.W. 2d 738 (1940).
"284 Ky. 587, 145 S.W. 2d 529 (1940).
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The title will revert upon failure of the intended purpose. In this
case the conveyance was for school purposes, "but for no other
purpose whatsoever, and not to be conveyed by second party to
use, or uses, of no individuals." Reference was made in Williams
v. Johnson40 to Fayette County Board of Education v. Bryan. °
where the deed read: ". . so long as the land is used for school
purposes." This case stands for the proposition that express words
of reservation are not necessary. The court has also said that general words "for school purposes are only descriptive of the nature
of the only use the school trustees may make of the property and
do not create a limitation or condition on the fee.""1 We find the
word "reverte often used loosely. Nunn v. WrightG2 is a case in
point. A provision in a deed conveying property to a husband
and wife stipulated that if the husband died before the wife the
property should revert to the wife and "her bodily heirs." The
court ruled that in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the
wife's children took no interest in the property. The words were
words of limitation and not of purchase.
Although the right of reverter is not a future interest but a
mere possibility of acquiring an interest in the future, it is to be
noted that this possibility can be released by the person having
it.

53

A not uncommon instance of a coiidition subsequent is where
a father deeds his farm to a son upon condition that the latter
support the father. In Manning v. Stree 4 the heirs sought to enforce the condition subsequent after the grantor's death. The
court said on breach of the condition the grantee's .title should
fail. However, in the particular case, it was found that the grantor
did not reserve the right to re-enter in the event of a breach of
the condition, "and there was no provision for a reverter" to indicate the intention of the parties that the grantee's title should
fail on a breach of the condition to support. Consequently, the
" Supra, n. 47.
'0263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936).

"Board of Ed., Taylor Co. v. Board of Ed., Campbell Co., 292 Ky. 261, 166
S.W. 2d 295 (1942).

303 Ky. 288, 197 S.W. 2d 439 (1946); and Honaker v. Hutchinson, 305
Ky. 790, 205 S.W. 2d 683 (1947).
'Murray Hospital Ass'n v. Mason, 306 Ky. 248, 206 S.W. 2d 936 (1947).
ra279 Ky. 253, 130 S.W. 2d 735 (1939).
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court said, the provision should not here be construed as a condition subsequent authorizing the heirs to maintain an action.
III.

Executory Limitations

An executory devise has been defined as a future interest
created by will that is to take effect at some time subsequent to
the devisor's death upon the happening of some event. The adoption of the Statute of Uses made such interests legal since a use
was a "light and nimble thing" and could shift the title from one
person to another upon the occurrence of the named event. Before the adoption of that statute they were recognized as enforceable in equity. These limitations were created by will. Today,
however, they may be created by deed as provided in KRS
881.040. Where an estate is created in one and his heirs but if a
certain contingency happens the estate is to pass to another, the
first taker is said to have a defeasible fee. Such estates are far
from uncommon. Several cases have arisen during the past fifteen
years where a husband has devised his estate to his widow "so
long as she remains my widow" or words to that effect.55 Or a
wife may devise property to her husband, but if he remarry then
over. 50 Gifts to testator's son or daughter, or grandchildren, but
if he or she or they die without heirs or heirs of the body then
the interest to go over to another person, is a type of case that
has often given rise to litigation. 7
A devise of property to grandchildren with the proviso that
if any die before arriving at twenty-four years of age then his or
her share to revert to testator's estate, the court said, operated to
'York v. York, 275 Ky. 573, 122 S.W. 2d 140 (1938); Charles v. Shortridge,
277 Ky. 183, 126 S.W. 2d 139 (1939); Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky. 181,
138 S.W. 2d 865 (1940); Cuddy v. McIntyre, 312 Ky. 606, 229 S.W. 2d 315
(1950); Points v. Points, 312 Ky. 348, 227 S.W. 2d 790 (1950); and Taylor v.
Farrow, 239 S.W. 2d 73 (1951).
' Fannin's Adm'r v. Segraves, 303 Ky. 697, 198 S.W. 2d 802 (1946).
"Deering v. Skidmore, 282 Ky. 292, 138 S.W. 2d 471 (1940); Mitchell v.
Dauphin Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W. 2d 181 (1940); Hite v. Barber, 284
Ky. 718, 145 S.W. 2d 1057 (1940); LeCompte v. Davis Exr, 285 Ky. 433, 148
S.W. 2d 292 (1941); Good Samaritan Hospital v. First Presbyterian Church, 286
Ky. 462, 151 S.W. 2d 78 (1941); Vittitow v. Birk, 290 Ky. 235, 160 S.W. 2d 624
(1942); Trumbo v. Sanford, 305 Ky. 231, 203 S.W. 2d 22 (1947); Kellogg v.
Meadows, 309 Ky. 21, 215 S.W. 2d 951 (1948); Weinberg v. Werf, 309 Ky. 731,
218 S.W. 2d 398 (1949); and Schuler v. Getzendoner, 314 Ky. 682, 236 S.W. 2d
964 (1951).
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deprive the grandchildren of a fee simple in the event of death
before attaining the specified age.58
In Medcalf v. Whitely's Admx, the court, after citing Fearne
and Jarman, said: "In the light of these authorities we are convinced that a life estate may be carved out of a preceding fee
simple by executory devise.... ." The will gave a fee to testator's
son, subject to a life estate in the son's wife, who in turn devised
it to the appellees in the case. The son was the only child of the
testator. He made his wife the sole devisee in his will. She thereby acquired the fee in the property and the appellees were held
to have a good fee simple title thereto.
Cases arise where a will or deed may provide that if the devisee or grantee does not convey the land, it shall go over to another at the death of the first60taker. Such provisions create defeasible fees in the first takers.
It was pointed out in Kurrie v. Kentucky Trust Co. of Louisville61 that a defeasible fee in remainder may be created in personalty.
IV. Construction of Limitations
The construction of terms used in wills and deeds has always
taken much of the court's time. Inl904, in the case of Harvey v.
Bell, 2 four rules were laid down as to the meaning to be given
phrases, "dying without children" and "dying without issue."
(1) "Where an estate is devised to one for life, with remainder
to another, and if the remainderman die without children or issue,
then to a third person," the rule restricts the words "dying without children or issue" to death before the termination of the particular estate.
(2) Where property is devised to infants upon the termination of an estate when it is to be divided among them and there'
is a provision that if any die without issue then to the survivor or
survivors, the phrase is limited to death before the time for distribution.
s Lindsay v. Williams, 279 Ky. 749, 132 S.W. 2d 65 (1939). See also Malone
v. Jamison, 312 Ky. 249, 227 S.W. 2d 179 (1950).
' 290 Ky. 94, 160 S.W. 2d 348 (1942).

' Head v. Head, 293 Ky. 371, 169 S.W. 2d 25 (1943); Kurrie v. Kentucky
Trust Co. of Louisville, 802 Ky. 592, 194 S.W. 2d 638 (1946); and Cassidy v.
Cain, 811 Ky. 179, 223 S.W. 2d 744 (1949).
Supra, n. 60.

Supra, n. 38.
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(8) If the devise is to a class, death without isue also refers to
death before the time of distribution.
(4) If there is no intervening estate the words "dying without
issue," in the absence of a contrary intent, create a defeasible fee
which will be cut short by death without issue at any time. The
court, however, pointed out that these rules must yield to the
intent of the testator as found in the will as a whole.
Furthermore, resort to legislative enactment was had in the
construction of "without heirs," "without children" or "issue" as
used in deeds and wills; and also where an estate is given for life
with "remainder to heirs." '
(a) "Heirs," "Heirs at Law"
The word "heirs," unless a different intent is shown in an instrument, is to be taken in its technical sense, 64 that is, those persons who take a decedents property as provided under the statute
of descent and distribution. In Vaughn v. Metcalf, however, the
court held that the word "heir" referred to a grandchild as the
"heir" of his daughter and showed an intent that the grandchild
take the fee in remainder and the testator did not intend the
grandchild to take as a testamentary heir of the daughter."' The
phrase "heirs at law" means, the court says, "heirs of the testator
as of the date of the death of the daughter," the life tenant.",
Where a will contained a provision that if any child of the testator
die without "heirs" the property was to go to the other heirs, the
reference was to death before the testator's death.67 The case
came within the first rule laid down in Harvey v. Bell.68 A conveyance by deed to a daughter "and her bodily heirs," since the
rule in Shelley's case has been abolished in this jurisdiction by
KRS 881.070, created an estate in fee simple."
'Ky. REV. STAT. (1948) Secs. 381.080, 881.090.
" Jennings v. Jennings, 299 Ky. 779, 187 S.W. 2d 459 (1945).
' 274 Ky. 379, 118 S.W. 2d 727 (1938). See Combs v. Combs, 294 Ky. 89,
171 S.W. 2d 13 (1943), and Holoway v. Crumbaugh, 275 Ky. 377, 121 S.W. 2d
924 (1938).
"Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., supra, n. 36.
' Good Samaritan Hospital v. First Presbyterian Church, 286 Ky. 462, 157
S.W. 2d 78 (1941).
- Supra, n. 38. Also Mitchell v. Deegan, 301 Ky. 587, 192 S.W. 2d 715
(1945).
(95allee v. Warner, 306 Ky. 846, 209 S.W. 2d 491 (1948). See also Clark v.
McGrann, 274 Ky. 1, 117 S.W. 2d 1021 (1938).
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(b) "Children"
In Ellison v. Smoots Adm'r 7 0 a provision in a devise was to the
effect that if the devisee should have no children, her share should
go to the children of testatrix's sister. The court observed: "Under
a well-established rule of interpretation such condition is held to
have reference to the death of the second devisee before the
termination of the life estate.... ." This comes within the first rule
laid down in Harvey v. Bell.7 1 There are several other recent cases
72
to the same effect.
In the absence of a contrary intention as shown by the whole
will, a devise to one and "his children" creates a fee simple in the
party named.7 3 Where the devise was to two younger daughters
of the testator and "to their children," it was held that "to their
children" were words of purchase and the daughters' children had
a remainder.7 4
(c) Classes
The third rule in Harvey v. Bell76 governs gifts to classes.
There are several recent decisions following this rule that where
the division of the remainder is postponed until the termination
of the particular estate, the remainder vests at the death of the
life tenant and only those living at the time share in the estate. 6
Sometimes the comt speaks of the "divide and pay rule" where
the remainder is held not to vest in members of the class until
the time for payment arrives.7"
Whether a gift of residue to legatees is a gift to a class or to
persons individually depends upon the intent of the testator.78
- 286 Ky. 768, 151 S.W. 2d 1017 (1941).
n. 38.v. Wooley, 294 Ky. 186, 171 S.W. 2d 256 (1943); Bennett v.
" Supra,
Deitchman
Bennett, 295 Ky. 393, 174 S.W. 2d 525 (1943); Parke v. Parkes Ex'r, 295 Ky.
634, 175 S.W. 2d 141 (1948); Pence v. Farris, 303 Ky. 97, 196 S.W. 2d 970
(1946); Hall v. Spencer, 312 Ky. 274, 227 S.W. 2d 196 (1950); and Turner v.
Simpson, 313 Ky. 780, 233 S.W. 2d 996 (1950).
' Boarders v. Skiles, 295 Ky. 670, 175 S.W. 2d 353 (1943); Collis v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 314 Ky. 15, 234 S.W. 2d 164 (1950).
'Stahr v. Mozley, 284 Ky. 552, 145 S.W. 2d 40 (1940).
Supra, n. 38.
Maingault's Adm'r v. Carrithers, 295 Ky. 654, 175 S.W. 2d 129 (1943);
Bill's Adm'x v. Bil's Exkr, 299 Ky. 749, 186 S.W. 2d 907 (1945) and Beam v.
Shirley, 301 Ky. 320, 191 S.W. 2d 248 (1945).
' Skiles v. Bowling Green Trust Co., 294 Ky. 211, 171 S.W. 2d 235 (1943);
and White v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 313 Ky. 230, 230 S.W. 2d 899
(1950).
" Shoenberg v. Lodenkemper's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 105, 234 S.W. 2d 501 (1950).
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It is also possible to create a class from a less number than the
natural class, from three of testator's four sons as was pointed out
in Horseman v. Horseman;79 and in Hardin v. Crow80 an estate
was to be equally divided between the widow's "nearest relatives
and my nearest relatives." This was held to create two classes and
all the relatives in a group shared on a per stirpes basis.
V. Powers
Jessel, M. R. of the English Chancery Division, has given in
simple words a definition of a power which is worth repeating.
He says a power is the right of disposition given a person over
property not his own by someone who directs the mode in which
that power shall be exercised by a particular instrument.81
Powers are classified as to their scope as general or special.
They may be exercised by deed or will as stipulated by the donor
of the power. It was provided in the donor's will in the case
of Liggett v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. 12 that the daugh-

ter of the testator should have a life estate in a trust fund
"with remainder in fee" as "she might appoint" and "in default of
such appointment" to "her issue." In her will the daughter disposed of her property including any over which she had any
power of appointment, giving the income to her son for life and
to his children at his death for their lives and on their deaths the
income to the son's grandchildren until they reach the age of
twenty-one years, when the corpus was to be distributed among
them. A codicil made some changes as to payment of the income.
Since the gift to the great-great-grandchildren of the original
donor of the power violated the rule against perpetuities, the son
claimed the exercise of the whole power was void. :he question
before the court then was whether the exercise of the whole
power was void since a part violated the rule against perpetuities.
The answer was found in the earlier case of Chenoweth v. Bullitt.83 To quote from that decision:

"309 Ky. 289, 217 S.W. 2d 645 (1949).

' Hardin v. Crow, 810 Ky. 814, 222 S.W. 2d 842 (1949).
' Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch. Div. 499 at 504 (1881).
274 Ky.387, 118 S.W.2d 720 (1938).
-224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W.2d 1061 (1928).

18

KENTucK

LAw JouRNAL

"Upon principle, there would seem to be no reason why the

invalidity of ultimate or penultimate limitations should
affect an antecedent estate which is good itself. A devise
to one for life, without more, is good; the reversion is in the

devisor's heirs. Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions it is not the rule in this State that the whole devise is
bad when its ultimate limitations are bad."
The power given the life tenant in Brown v. Harlow8 4 was general, exercisable inter vivos. A deed gave to the grantee for life
with power "to dispose of by him as he might see cause and to go
at his death to his son and two daughters." The grantee had the
right to sell the property in his life-time and by so doing extinguish the defeasible fee in remainder held by his children.
It has also been held the power to sell and reinvest the proceeds gave the right to make a private sale and convey a good
title.85 A limited power, however, was given an executor where
he was required to secure the consent of testator's widow and two
sons before he could sell the devised property. The death of one
of the sons extinguished the power of the executor.""
In Harlan v. Citizens National Bank of Danville,87 a testamentary power provided "that said George L. Harlan may devise
his interest to his widow, his descendants or my descendants." An
appointment of all estate to the donee's brother was upheld as the
power was exclusive. The donee could exclude one or more objects unless the donor of the power forbade the donee's so doing.
Ordinarily the power to sell does not include the power to
mortgage. However, a power which read "He shall have full
power to use and expend any part or all of said estate for any purpose whatsoever.... ." was held broad enough to allow the donee
to mortgage the property. There was a gift over of what he had
not disposed of during his lifetime.88 Also, where property was
given a son in trust "to hold, manage and control same as if i
were his own" with power to sell and "to use the proceeds in any
way his judgment suggests," it was held this language gave the
power to mortgage the property in order to preserve and improve
the same. 9
305 Ky. 285, 203 S.W. 2d 60 (1947).

Childers v. Welch, 304 Ky. 700, 202 S.W. 2d 169 (1947).
' Whisman v. McMullen's Exr, 312 Ky. 402, 227 S.W. 2d 926 (1950).
' 305 Ky. 285, 203 S.W. 2d 285 (1947).

Morgan v. Meacham, 279 Ky. 526, 130 S.W. 2d 992 (1939).

Gaither v. Gaither, 288 Ky. 145, 155 S.W. 2d 746 (1941).
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Where a power in a deed authorized the owner of the life
estate to sell the land and reinvest the proceeds and stated that
the obligation to reinvest was on the life tenant, the purchaser was
held to be under no obligation to see that the proceeds were reinvested."
The question sometimes arises as to whether the donee has
renounced his right to exercise the power. A statutory provision 9
provides that such an intention must appear in the donee's will.
In United States Trust Co. v. Winchester92 the court found an intention not to exercise the power. The opposite conclusion was
reached in Union Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington v. Bassett.9 3 The
court found nothing in the donee's will that showed an intention
not to exercise the power. The donee's will in this case d-ected
the payment of "my" debts, funeral expenses, costs of administration, "federal estate and state inheritance taxes." It was held that
it was not the intention of the donee of the power to burden her
own estate with the estate taxes on the property passing under
the power and directed that it be paid out of the appointed
property.
Then there is the question as to a minor's right to exercise a
power of appointment. Owens v. Owens 4 refers to the general
proposition that an infant may exercise a collateral power but
cannot exercise a power appendant. The exercise of the latter
power would affect his own property. A power in a deed given
an infant is to be exercised when the grantee becomes of age.
The court points out that it had so held in an earlier case. The
facts in the Owens case were that a soldier left an instrument
purporting to make his mother beneficiary of the "death gratuity"
provision in his service life insurance policy. It was ineffective to
change the beneficiary as it did not conform to power given in the
policy itself.
VI. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The confusion in terminology caused by the unfortunate wording of statutes supposed to incorporate the common law rule
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chenault, 282 Ky. 252, 138 S.W. 2d 490

(1939).

"9Ky. REv.

STAT. (1948) sec. 394.060.
'277 Ky. 434, 126 S.W. 2d 1128 (1939).
t253 S.W. 2d 632 (1952).
- 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W. 2d 580 (1947).
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against perpetuities still crops out in court opinions dealing with
remote vesting of estates in property. The court evidently intended to settle the question once for all in its opinion in Cammack v. Allen,95 which was decided thirty years ago. As Judge
Thomas pointed out in his opinion, Section 2360 of the statutes,
now KRS 381.220, "... has always been treated and referred to
in the opinions of this court as Kentucky's statute against perpetuities.... In none of the opinions was the statute referred to
as creating a rule with reference to the imposition of such restraints.... ." KRS 381.220 reads as follows:
"The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended,
by any limitation or condition whatsoever, for a longer
period than during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estates, and twenty-one years and
ten months thereafter."
The rule against perpetuities according to the generally
adopted view in this country is a rule against remote vesting of
estates and not a rule against restraints on alienation. As pointed
out by Gray, future estates, if alienable, cannot violate the rule.
The present owner of a future interest can convey what interest
he has in the future estate. The rule, he says, "would have been
better had it been called the Rule against Remoteness." 6
In Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher97 the Kentucky court said that
section 381.220 was enacted as declaratory of the common law
rule against perpetuities. The court quoted from an earlier decision9" where it was said in construing the clause in question:
"The test, therefore, for determining the existence of a
perpetuity, is not whether the event or contingency named
upon which the estate devised may vest in the ultimate
takers does happen or may happen, but whether it is possible that it might not happen within that time. If it is possible that the event or contingency upon which the estate
will finally vest may not happen within the limit prescribed
by the rule against perpetuities, the instrument is void...."
t'199 Ky. 268, 272, 250 S.W. 963 (1923).

See Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265,

188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945).
' Gavy, Tim RULE AGAUST PERPm, rrrs (4th ed., 1942), 3, 4.
3302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946).

Tyler v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939, 941
(1914).

FuTuRE INT.EREsTs

In Emler v. Emler's Trustee99 the court went contra to this rule
of construing clauses involving perpetuities and took the construction that made the devise good under the rule. It was said "the
court will adopt the construction which does not violate the
statute." However, the correct rule of construction was followed
in later cases that "the rule against perpetuities is not to be tested
by actualities, but by possibilities."0 0
The Court of Appeals formerly took a minority view as to
options, that an option was not a limitation on the sale or conveyance of land and was not within the rule against perpetuities. 1 1 In recent decisions it has adopted the majority view that
options come within the rule.102
The question arises in gifts to a class as to whether the estate
may possibly vest beyond a life or lives in being, twenty-one years
and ten months. A gift to go to the testator's grandnieces and
nephews at the death of the life tenant, including "any that may
yet be born," was held good as the court found it was the testator's
intent "to limit the devise to children of his nieces and nephews
living at the time of his death." It further said: "The whole devise
is not void because the statute has been violated. That which is
03
good, if separable from the bad, will be allowed to stand."'
Where the estate was to be kept intact for fifty years after the
death of the testator and the income to be divided among his
children, it was held the rule against perpetuities was violated.
The court said: "The children might live beyond the period of
restraint, but that is not the test. The rule deals with possibilities
and not probabilities."0 4
In two or three decisions gifts over to churches or to school
boards have been before the court to determine whether the gifts
violated the rule against perpetuities. In Smith v. Fowler'05 after
€'269 Ky. 27, 106 S.W. 2d 79 (1937).
McGaughey v. Spencer Co. Board of Ed., 285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W. 2d 519
(1941); Goodloe's Trustee v. Goodloe, 292 Ky. 494, 166 S.W. 2d 836 (1942);
Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. 2d 568 (1944), and Ford v. Yost, 299
Ky. 682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1945).
' See Coley v. Hard, 250 Ky. 250, 62 S.W. 2d 792 (1933).
...
Maddox v. Keeler, supra, n. 100; Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230
S.W. 2d 918 (1950); and Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W. 2d 943 (1951).
"Tuttle v. Steele, 281 Ky. 218, 135 S.W. 2d 436 (1939). See also Holoway
v. Crumbaugh, supra, n. 65.
Fox v. Burgher, 285 Ky. 470, 148 S.W. 2d 342 (1941).
13%01 Ky. 96, 190 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945).
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the death of the life tenant the devised property was to go to
"lineal descendants and after the death of all children and their
lineal descendants to an educational board." The gift was held
void. In Cambron v. Pottinger'0 6 the will provided for a specified
sum to go to a certain church after the death of the life tenant
and the remainder to be equally divided between testator's and
his wife's heirs equally. These gifts over were not in violation of
the rule. In Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher 07 the court said that a
gift over to a church after the death of the children of a named
nephew who survived the testator was a violation of the rule.
However, a reservation of part of the land conveyed was made for
so long as it was used for the benefit of schools and churches and
the gift did not violate the rule as the court said the fee was
always vested by the reservation. 08
Another problem presented by some of the recent decisions is
that of the application of the rule to a continuing trust, frequently
called an indestructible trust. Of course the rule applies to trust
where there is a question of remote vesting of a fund or estate involved, as where the trustee is to pay over at a remote time a
fund to a person whom he is given discretion in selecting. 0 9
Today it is generally considered that there is a third rule relating
to the duration of trusts. An authority in the field of trusts makes
the following statement in regard to the duration of trusts:
"Courts and writers sometimes state in a rather loose fashion
that every express private trust must be limited in duration
to a period not longer than lives in being when the trust
starts and twenty-one years thereafter. This would make it
appear that there is some common law or generally adopted
statutory rule directly and in so many words limiting the
possible life of a trust. This is incorrect, except in a few
states where trusts in general, or certain trusts, have been
limited in their duration by statute."" 0
He further points out that trusts are destructible if the cestui,
when of age and sound mind, can call for a conveyance of the

"301 Ky. 768, 193 S.W. 2d 412 (1945).
Supra, n. 96.
(19Egner et ux. v. Livingston Co. Bd. of Ed., 313 Ky. 168, 230 S.W. 2d 448
(1950). See Bates v. Bates, supra, n. 102.
Eorrrs (4th ed., 1942), sec. 412.
2 10GnAGy, THE RuLE AGAINST P ea,
BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), sec. 218.
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legal estate or possession of the trust res and terminate the trust.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts reads:
"A trust is not invalid either in whole or in part merely because the duration of the trust may exceed the period of the
rule against perpetuities, provided that the interests of all
of the beneficiaries must vest within the period.""'
Turning to the recent Kentucky cases, let us see how the court
has dealt with cases involving trusts. In Tillman v. Blackburn"2
the question was whether the provision in a will created a continuing trust for the benefit of the descendants of her daughter's
children, without any limitation to time. "It would not follow
that the will was void as being in violation of the statute of
perpetuities, but would be valid," the court said, "as to the
descendants of those living at the time" of the death of the life
tenant. The devise in trust for testatrix's children for life with a
gift over to a child's issue at the age of twenty-one, provided for
in Goodloe's Trustee v. Goodloe," 3 was held not to violate the rule
against perpetuities.
In another case a testator devised part of his estate to his son
and his children in trust for thirty years after the probate of the
will. This was held void "because it violated the statute and rule
against perpetuities." 4 The trust considered in Letcher's Trustee
v. Letcher" 5 was also held to violate the rule. In that case, however, the question was whether the future estate would vest within
the period limited by the rule.
A fifty-year testamentary trust for payment of taxes and insurance on a farm was held to violate the rule of perpetuities in
Thornton v. Kirtley." 6 At the end of the fifty-year period the balance of the income from the fund was to be distributed among
testatrix's children. A trust for maintenance of graves came within
KRS 381.260, providing for charitable trusts.
First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington v. PurcelllT
presented an interesting problem: whether the provision in a
SRESTATMNT TRUSTS (1935), sec. 62, Comment k.
276 Ky. 550, 124 S.W. 2d 755 (1939).
Supra, n. 100.
"'Ford v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945).
" Supra, n. 97.
1"249 S.W. 2d 803 (1952).
-1244 S.W. 2d 458 (1951).
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twenty- year endowment insurance policy for change of beneficiaries violated the rule. A testamentary trust was set up for the
benefit of testator's children. The trustee was to pay the premiums
on the policies until the policies were fully paid up and the trust
was to continue until such time. The trust was held not to violate
the rule against perpetuities. The court cited with approval from
Gray, the statement that "The Rule against Perpetuities concerns
rights of property only, and does not affect the making of contracts which do not create rights of property."" 8
VII.

Restraints on Alienation

The distinction between the rule against perpetuities and a
condition or limitation that restrains the alienation of the property
conveyed or devised subject thereto was clearly pointed out by
the court in Cammack v. Allen." 9 The latter rule, the court said,
deals "with the right of alienation by a person in whom the fee
vested within the permissible period prescribed by it." The Kentucky rule against restraints on alienation is well stated in Lawson
v. Lightfoot. -0 Judge Settle, in giving the opinion in that case,
said:
"It must be conceded that the great weight of authority outside Kentucky is to the effect that, where the fee-simple title
to real estates passes under a deed or will, any restraint attempted to be imposed by the instrument upon its alienation
by the grantee, or devisee, is to be freated as void, and such
is clearly the rule announced by Mr. Gray in his excellent
work on Restraints of Alienation; but the contrary view has
been adopted by this court in repeated decisions ....
This
court has, however, never fixed a limit to such restraints.
The restraint must be reasonable and the court itself will determine what is reasonable on the facts of a particular case.
In England v. Davis'2 ' it was held that where the grantor and
grantee joined in a conveyance of the property they gave 'a good
fee simple title to a third party even though the deed the grantor
had given the grantee provided that the grantee should not "rent,
lease nor sell the said land without the grantor's consent only to
Tnr RULE- AGAINST PERPmTUrrms (4th ed. 1942), sec. 329, p. 360.
Supra, n. 95.
"'84 S.W. 739, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 217 (1905).
"'

"'273 Ky. 424, 116 S.W. 2d 977 (1938).
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each other." A restraint, however, on a donee of a fee preventing
him from exercising the power to encumber or alienate the property during his lifetime was held void in Lindsay v. Williams,122
and in Newson v. Barnes 23 the beneficiary under a trust which
was not to terminate until his sister attained the age of twentyone years, was allowed to convey his interest and all income
from the trust prior to the time of termination of the trust. The
court relied on KRS 381.040.
In Hite v. Barbe, 24 the court, unmindful of what had been
said in its decision in Cammack v. Allen, 25 said that a restraint
that forbade selling or mortgaging the property for sixty years
violated KRS 881.220. Also, in Winn v. William, 2 this statute was
cited as the basis of holding a restraint on alienation for the lifetime of testator's children void. The gift of the balance of testator's estate in trust until the donee became twenty-five years of
age was found to create a dry trust since no active duty was imposed on the trustee. This vested a fee in the beneficiary at once
27
which he could dispose of if he so desired. And in Kelly v. Marr'
it was unsuccessfully contended by counsel for appellant that
under section 381.220 of the Statutes the testator had a right to
restrain the alienation of the property for the time mentioned in
the statute, that is, for a life or lives in being, twenty-one years
and ten months. The court pointed out in the case of Trosper v.
Shoemaker 28 that KRS 381.220 had no application as the case
concerned a restraint on the use of the property sold. The grantee
of a filling station was to continue the use of petroleum products
sold by the grantor. It was held that the covenant was not an
unreasonable restraint and was not void.
Finally, the court has found valid restraints not to alienate the
land during the grantor's lifetime, where a son was under obligation to support the father during his lifetime. Such an agreement
to support was the consideration for the conveyance and the court
held the provision reserved a life estate in the father. 2 9 The
2279 Ky. 749, 132 S.W. 2d 65 (1939).
- 282 Ky. 264, 138 S.W. 2d 996 (1940).
84 Ky. 718, 145 S.W. 2d 1058 (1940).
Supra, n. 95.
'-292 Ky. 44, 165 S.W. 2d 961 (1942).
2 299 Ky. 447, 185 S.W. 2d 945 (1945). See also Gray v. Gray, supra, n. 30,
and Ford v. Yost, supra, n. 100.
' 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W. 2d 176 (1950).
'Chapman v. Blackburn, 295 Ky. 606, 175 S.W. 2d 26 (1943).
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chancellor in another case ruled that there was an implied right
to mortgage the property to pay testator's debts although the
property was not to be sold or divided until the youngest son
should reach the age of twenty-seven. 30
Conclusion
The survey of the decisions rendered in Kentucky during the
past fifteen years shows that few marked changes in the law of
future property interests have been made. Perhaps the most
notable is that of holding options within the rule against perpetuities. This shift brings Kentucky in line with the majority
view that an option is within the rule against perpetuities.
Construction of deeds and wills has taken considerable time
of the courts in getting at the meaning of a grantor or a testator.
This is especially true in determining who is to be included in a
class gift. The rules laid down in Harvey v. Bell' 3' for determining

when a class is made up have been followed. In one case the court
overlooked the general rule that in determining whether the devise in question violated the rule against perpetuities the test is
not the actuality but the possibility of the rule's being violated
and said that the construction would be taken that did not violate
2
the statute.

13

The wording of section 381.220 in terms of restraint against
alienation when, as the court has said, it is a rule against vesting
of future interests still causes confusion in terms used in opinions
dealing with restraints on alienation. There was doubtless some
such idea in the English view of the rule that if an owner of a
vested estate cannot alienate his interest during the period of a
life or lives in being twenty-one years and nine months, then the
estate cannot vest within that period. It will be recalled that
counsel in the case of Kelly v. Mari.

3

took our statutory statement

of the rule against perpetuities literally, too, and argued that since
a restraint on alienation was forbidden for a longer period than a
life or lives in being twenty-one years and ten months, it could be
restrained for that period.
'
"
'

Breetz v. Hill, 293 Ky. 526, 169 S.W. 2d 632 (1943).
Supra, n. 38.
Emler v. Emler's Trustee, supra, n. 99.
Supra, n. 127.

